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5. Europe Surrenders to Nationalism, 1848-1871 
As we have already seen, the year 1848 saw the European 
continent distracted by insurrectionary outbreaks thattouched 
every one of the major powers. Liberalism and democracy con-
tributed greatly to the undercurrents of discontent under the 
apparent calm of the previous decade, but it was nationalist 
aspirations that furnished most of the fuel £or~~tne revolutlon-
ary fires of that fateful year. In England and France, where 
the struggle for unification had long before been won, nation-
alism played no part. It was in Germany, Italy, and the Austrian 
Empire that nationalist agitators filled the larger roles in 
the several revolutions of 1848. 
^ 
~-
The ignominious failure of the Frankfurt Assembly did not 
entirely quash the hopes of patriotic Germans that they would 
some day be united under one flag. Union, when it came, they 
saw, could come only by defying Austria, a land inhabited by 
many non-German minorities. Successful defiance of the Haps-
burg power would be realized only under the military leadership 
of Austria's great German rival, Prussia. Since 1815, the 
Hohenzollern rulers of Prussia had worked assiduously — and 
with notable success — to make of their relatively small 
kingdom a highly efficient, disciplined, and militarily power-
ful state. As such, the Prussian kingdom commended itself to 
German nationalists as a model for an enlarged and independent 
Germany. The Zollverein of 1834 had clearly demonstrated the 
practical advantages to he obtained from political unity, and 
when the visionary and liberal delegates jit Frankfurt failed 
Bo^miaerahly r German nationaliatiTturnefl wlth"underatandable 
logic to embrace Prussian militarism^ 
Nationalist elements in Germany at length discovered a 
capable leader in the person of Otto von BismarcK (lSHPISaal, 
a landed aristocrat, absolutist, and militarist who became 
Prussia's chief minister in 1862. Bismarck had little use for 
parliamentary processes, and his idea of a siir.r.pnsful policy 
was one wrought., as he said, "lay blood and iron." He overrode 
the Prussian parliament, muzzled the press, suppressed oppoaj.-
tion factions, and employed diplomatic wiles to beguile other 
nations into wars~WHich benefited Prussia. Almost without in-
terruption he built up the army, strengthened the economy, and 
promoted the power of the monarchy. 
In 1864, Bismarck obtained the cooperation of Austria in a 
war with Denmark over the largely German-speaking provinces of 
Schleswig and Hoistein. The Danes were speedily dispossessed 
of these two territories and, not to Bismarck's surprise, 
Prussia and Austria quarreled over the spoils. In the Seven 
Weeks War which followed, Austria could provide nothing to match 
Prussian military prowess, and as Bismarck had intended, Prussia 
emerged as the leading German state. Cannily extending generous 
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peace terms to the defeated Austrians, the Prussian minister 
succeeded in neutralizing the Hapsburgs as he moved further to 
unite Germany under Prussian dominance. Two-thirds of Germany 
joined Prussia in a North German Confederation (1867), governed 
by a federal parliament and presided over by the Prussian king. 
Only four other German states (plus Austria) remained outside 
the Prussian orbit. But one additional obstacle was left which 
m i g h t p r e v e n t t h e f i n a l u n T f T c a t i o ^
 mQft fievTnany t i m _ h n s n i o 
a j t ^ i t i i d e - - & i H - K a p ^ . 
Napoleon III faced no problems of national unification in 
Frange_, yet he defended the benevolent dictatorship which he 
had imposed as necessary to the country's national salvation. 
He played up the name Napoleon, proclaiming that it "stands for 
order, authority, religion, the welfare of the people within, 
and without for national dignity." Seeking to represent him-
self as the guardian of the welfare of all the French people, 
the emperor pursued a policy which was designed to identify him 
with each of the numerous factions in France's political life. 
In foreign affairs he extended French colonial holdings, tried 
to widen trade opportunities, and engaged in doubtful ventures 
abroad in lands as far apart as the Crimea and Mexico. Napoleon 
relied successfully on the popular desire in France to see 
national prestige rehabilitated following the vacillation and 
squabbling which had characterized the Second Republic (1848-
1851). All this required of him, an essentially peaceloving 
man, that he conduct an aggressive foreign policy. In addition, 
Napoleon seems to have been sincerely devoted to the abstract 
principle of nationalism for all the peoples of Europe. This 
it was, perhaps, that induced him to acquiesce in Prussia's 
steady absorption of other German states, and it certainly was 
a factor in his active support of Italian nationalists against 
Austrian rule in Italy. 
By 1869, however, this opportunistic pursuit of a difficult 
course had lost him friends and won him enemies both within and 
without France. His dabbling in Italian affairs on the side of 
the anti-Papal forces alienated Roman Catholics in France. When 
he at length abandoned the Italian nationalists he lost the 
support of liberals in his own country. His ill-fated Mexican 
adventure destroyed his reputation among French ultraimperial-
ists. Eventually he faced the necessity of making liberal con-
cessions to the various opposition groups in France, or else 
diverting them by a successful venture in foreign affairs. Be-
fore he had time to decide definitely on either of these two 
courses he became involved in a fatal quarrel with Prussia. 
For some time the French had been regarding with increasing 
anxiety the development of the powerful North German Confedera-
tion across the Rhine. Their worst fears seemed justified in 
1868, when the Spanish people offered their recently vacated 
throne to a Hohenzollern cousin of William I of Prussia. Con-
fronted with the direful prospect of German Hohenzollerns just 
beyond both the Rhine and the Pyrenees, Napoleon protested. 
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Undoubtedly he saw in the occasion an opportunity to bolster 
support for his crumbling regime at home by an aggressive atti-
tude toward Prussia. In 1870, Napoleon ordered the French 
ambassador in Berlin to demand that William forever forego sup-
port for his kinsman as king of Spain. So insistent was the 
envoy from Paris that William abruptly dismissed him, and in a 
telegram (the Ems Dispatch) reported the incident to the wily 
Bismarck. 
Bismarck edited the king's report in such a way that it 
appeared the French ambassador had insulted the Prussian king, 
who in turn had curtly and unreasonably rejected the French 
protest. Napoloen had not wanted war but a surge of German 
jingoism was more than matched by Parisian crowds who gathered 
in the streets with cries of "On to Berlin!" As it had been 
against Austria, Prussian military might was overwhelming. 
After six weeks of war the inept French army was routed and 
Napoleon surrendered himself and 86,000 of his troops. Four 
months later Paris capitulated after a siege, and the Second 
Empire was brought to an inglorious end. Napoleon abdicated, 
and like Charles X and Louis Philippe before him, sought refuge 
in England. 
Rid of their emweror. the French convoked a National 
Assembly which ujidfixjobk ta-Jiegoti aie—aHpeace settlement with 
thje-anemy,. It was not, with Prussia h n w p Y e j y tOiat the Treaty,...^ 
qXJ^a^kiftnrt (1871) was eventually arranged. During the war 
the southern German states joined""ill ah*" alliance with the North 
German Confederation against their common hereditary foe. The 
union was completed when an assembly of German princes, gathered 
in"the famous Hall of Mirrors at Versailles Palace, hailed 
William I as German Emperor (1871). German unification was at 
last achieved, not under the auspices of liberals and democrats, 
but by Prussian militarism and the Bismarckian policy of blood 
and iron. The Franco-Prussian war, while destroying one empire, 
had created another, the latter dedicated to the proposition 
that militarism was the most effective weapon of nationalism. 
Meanwhile, the French, burdened with a humiliating treaty, 
struggled to form a new government. In 1875, after a stormy 
period of political turmoil, the Third Republic-was firmly es-
tablished and it endured until 1940. 
Italian unification came through a closer cooperation be-
tween liberals and nationalists than in Germany, but even here 
it eventually occurred when more power-conscious men took 
charge. As we have seen, the exhortations of Mazzini provided 
the Italian Risorgimento with its articles of faith. But also, 
as in Germany - liberal idealism suffered a disastrous setback 
in the failure of the 1848-1849 revolt against Austrian domin-
ance. Farsighted Italians recognized that Austrian influence 
in Italy, the greatest obstacle to unification, was too strong 
to be uprooted by Italian effort alone. Two requirements would 
have to be met to achieve both independence and unity — ; a 
foreign ally must be found and some Italian state would have to 
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prove sufficiently loyal and capable to provide a rallying 
point for Italian patriotism. Fortunately, jhe potential ally 
was France and the Italian state which became the nucleus for a 
n ~ a t i o n a 1 e f f o r t a p p e a r e d . ,i.n, t h e K i n g d o m p f S a r d i n i a - p i e d m o n t . 
The practical politician and sagacious statesman who welded the 
two^T^getEiaF^was Camillo di Cavour (1810-1861) . By_diplomacy 
and statecraft "Cavour accomplished for Italy what Bismarck 
achieved for Germany,, 
By the standards of his day, Cavour was a liberal, al-
though as a staunch monarchist he had little sympathy for 
Mazzini's republicanism. He was convinced that the House of 
Savoy 5 which ruled in his native Sardinia-Piedmont, could lead 
the way to the realization of the dreams of Italian nationalists 
In 1S50 jnavour became Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, 
and in this post he sought to make the kingdom both materially 
and morally worthy of the cause he had in mind. He promoted , 
industrial development bail* railways, negotiated commercial 
treatfeSj and raised an army from the increased taxes which he 
persuaded the parliament to- le»y. Although these policies 
appear to parallel those of Bismarck in Prussia., Cavour made 
Sardinia-Piedmont a pattern of liberal goypynme^t' His reforms 
were" heFaTa*ed~~tnroughout Italy and the rest of the world (as an 
ex-journalist Cavour was adept at publicity) and Sardinia's 
efforts won the respect and admiration of western Europe. Par-
ticularly in the other Italian states the grossly misgoverned 
populace regarded the kingdom as a model and looked to it for 
leadership. 
Cavour s external policies were perhaps even more note-
worthy and dramatic. Aware that Italian unification would most 
likely be accomplished by shrewd diplomacy rather than by fervid 
revolutionary idealism alone, he injected the "Italian Question" 
into the councils of Europe. His big chance came in 1853 with 
the outbreak of the Crimean War. Against the advice of many of 
his compatriots who were less perceptive than he, Cavour per-
suaded the Sardinian parliament to enter the war as an ally of 
France and England against Russia. The small Sardinian army 
gave a good account of itself. "Never mind," declared a Sardin-
ian soldier struggling in the mud before Sevastopol, "of this 
mud Italy will be made." 
• 
For her part in the victory, Sardinia was awarded a seat 
at the congress of Paris (1856) where the peace was to be made. 
Cavour went to the French capital determined to introduce the 
Italian Question into the deliberations. Although he received 
little more than sympathy from Great Britain, he succeeded in 
arousing the nationalist sentiments of Napoleon III. In 1858, 
Napoleon agreed to support Sardinia against Austria in a "War 
for Italian Liberation." In return for the long-desired prov-
inces of Nice and Savoy, the French emperor pledged military 
assistance. Not only did Cavour play upon Napoleon's well-
known nationalist sentiments, but he dangled before him the 
prospect of weakening Austria, the country which the French 
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emperor had long regarded as the chief rival of France on the 
European continent. 
At first the war, which broke in 1859, went well for the 
allied Sardinian and French troops. The Austrians were driven 
back in bloody battles, and from all over the Italian boot 
patriots came flocking. Revolts broke out in other Italian 
states, and the prospects fc^ r"""T""r"""T"i"a^  Sardin-
ian leadership seemed bright. As this point, however, Napoleon 
grew alarmed. Sardinia as a strong buffer state was one thing, 
but a united Italy on his southern borders suddenly appeared to 
be something else. Moreover, Roman Catholics in France, fear-
ful that unification in Italy would result in the absorption 
of the Papal States, criticized Napoleon's policy. Fearing 
also that Prussia might intervene on the side of Austria, 
almost without warning Napoleon abandoned the campaign and 
signed a separate peace with the Hapsburgs = The disillusioned 
Sardinians, usaable to pursue the war further without French 
aid, were compelled to ©ontent themselves with the union of 
most of Italy north of the Papal States under their king, 
Victor Emmanuel II (1849-1878). As a reward for his short-
lived intervention, Napoleon obtained Nice and Savoy, an acqui-
sition later confirmed by a plebiscite. 
The Papal States and the Kingdom of the Two gjLcjjjj3s were 
yet to~"***ge^jpined to tne rest of Tt.aTy while Venetia and it! 
historic port of Venice were yet under Austrian control 
this juncture Guiseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) appeared on the 
scene. A warrior and seasoned revolutionary, Garibaldi was 
famous all over Italy for his daring. When word arrived of an 
incipient revolution on the island of Sicily,, this rough free-
lance adventurer responded to an invitation to lead the liber-
ation movement. With a volunteer regiment of "red-shirts." 
Garibaldi led his celebrated "One Thousand" (actually 1,150 
men) in an invasion of the island in I860,. Within six months 
he had _won thousands of Sicilians to his cause~"""aT***a_ nan wrested 
t^ieJJ*rsTand from its Bourbon prince.~ In September^ GaribaTdi Ts 
host, nSW^greaily enlarged, crossed to Naples, met only feeble 
resistance, and quickly completed the conquest of southern 
Italy. Cavour feared the repercussions in Europe should Gari-
baldi invade Rome, and to forestall this Victor Emmanuel II led 
an army into the Papal States. Garibaldi's devotion to his king 
persuaded him to surrender his conquests, Plebiscites, a prac-
tice increasingly identified with nationalist procedures in 
Europe, resulted in overwhelming popular approval of annexation 
to Sardinia. An Italian parliament met in 1861, and proclaimed 
Victor Emmanuel "King of Italy." 
In 1866, Italy entered into a convenient alliance with 
Prussia in the Seven Weeks War against Austria. Neither the 
Papal States nor Venetia were yet included within the new realm. 
Cavour died in 1861, but his successful mixture of opportunism 
and astute diplomacy formed the basis of the policies of his 
successors. For their part in this successful struggle, the 
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Italians acquired Venetia. Rome, although proclaimed the pro-
spective capital of Italy by the Italian parliament, still re-
mained apart, since Napoleon's troops occupied the Eternal 
City to protect papal interests. However, when France fell 
before the Prussian onslaught in 1870, French soldiers were 
rejnoyed from Rome, and wit 1^" ^ m™" f e t a^^ a 1 H i g ri troops took 
possession.. Mazzini's dream and Cavour's great objective were 
at last a reality, and for the first time in more than a thous-
and years Italy was a unified and independent nation. 
The Austrian Empire, which had battled valiantly if unsuc-
cessfully against nationalist uprisings in Germany and Italy, 
confronted revolutionary nationalism at home. After the fail-
ure of the Magyar revolt of 1848-1849, the severe and autocratic 
Hapsburg policy failed to extinguish Hungarian desires for 
national independence. Extremist revolutionaries, like Louis 
Kossuth, were broken and discredited by their failure, and the 
way was now open for the rise of moderate Magyar nationalists 
such as Francis Delik (1803-1876). A nobleman, lawyer, and 
statesman, De*ak exerted considerable influence through his 
patient and intelligent policy of negotiation rather than revo-
lution. After the early military defeats administered to 
Austria in the War for Italian Liberation in 1859, the emperor 
admitted the'need for internal reform. In an effort to stifle 
the domestic discord.which would wreck the empire, Francis 
Joseph (1848-1916) listened with interest to Peak's proposal 
for a "dualmonarchy." . Under it the Magyars would,gain auton-
omy .and would"" share w1 +.h"TK*e r.e.^ ma1E****ii1ic||"^  a n s rule of the re-
maining subject nationalities within the empire.. 
This unique arrangement w « to "asJca-^fW8**CT'T~"W^MEhi<agJU^ 
virtuajTy- independent, ot eaoh other evnept for a common sov-
ereign. Each would have its own constitution„ parliament. 
miuiistry^^Tand^postal and monetary systems.. An imperial min-
istry, with "representatives from both states, would conduct 
foreign affairs under the supervision and authority of the 
emperor. Each would provide revenues for the common needs, 
and tariffs between them would be settled by direct negotiation. 
Francis Joseph and his successors would be crowned in both 
countries — as emperor in Austria and king in Hungary -- and 
they would retain practically autocratic powers in each. 
Austria's disastrous defeat in the war with Prussia in 
1867 led to a quick accession to Deak's proposal. The dual 
monarchy established in that year lasted until the end of World 
War I in 1918. Nevertheless, the minority nationalities in 
Austria-Hungary — Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Ruthenians, Croats, 
Slovenes, Serbs, Rumanians, and Italians — remained restive, a 
restiveness that contributed greatly to the outbreak of World 
War I in 1914. 
A final word on the development of nationalism in eastern 
Europe during the nineteenth century should be added. Russia's 
defeat in the Crimean War led in 1856 to the liberation of the 
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people of Moldavia and Wallachia from the Russian protectorate 
over them. Their leaders approached the Congress of Paris with 
pleas for national union under a foreign prince. A plebiscite 
was arranged which resulted in the creation of Rumania in 1861. 
These events struck the spark of nationalism among other Balkan 
peoples. One by one they cast off Turkish control, and by 1878 
Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were recognized as independent 
states by the great powers. Bulgaria, still nominally under 
Turkish control, gained considerable autonomy. 
